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Database aumentication via crypcographic checksums
represents an important approach co achieving an affordable
safeguard of the integriry of data in publicly accessible database
systems against illegal manipulations. This paper revisits me
issue of database integriry and offers a new method of safeguarding me authenriciry of data in database systems. The
method is based on me recent development of pseudo-random
function families and sibling intractable function families,
rather man on me traditional use of crypcosystems. The database authentication scheme can be applied co records or fields.
The advantage of the scheme lies in the fact mat each record
can be associated with one checksum, while each data element
in me record can be verified using me checksum independendy
of the omer data elements in me record. The securiry of me
scheme depends on the difficulry of predicting the outputs of
pseudo-random functions and on inverting the sibling intractable function family. The same approach can also be applied to
the generation of encipherment keys for databases.

Keywords: Information securiry, Database securiry, Database
integriry, Authentication, Crypcography, Database systems,
Sibling intractable function family.

1. Introduction

T

he problem of providing integrity to data
stored in database systems has been a subject
of interest among researchers for a number of
years. In many cases the need to maintain the
integrity of the data carried a higher priority than
the need for information secrecy. Examples of such
situations range from public medical information
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to statistical results from public events (e.g.
elections) which are publicly readable, but which
can be modified only by authorized users.
The most common method of ensuring integrity of
data in a database is to use cryptographic checksums.
A checksum is typically calculated on a piece of
data (such as a database field entry or a record) as a
function of some secret parameter which is available only to the authorized users.
The notion of a cryptographic checksum has been
embodied in the past within the concept of a database filter which is to be located between the user
and the database management system. From the
point of view of the development of database
security technology, the concept of a filter was
perhaps one of the earliest to appear due to its
simplicity. Given a database system to be protected,
it was only natural to think initially of an intermediary between the user and the database system,
in the form of a filter that simply screens out data
according to some policy for labelling data.
One of the earliest realizations of the idea of a filter
was the integrity lock approach, which was suggested
initially by the us Air Force Summer Study on
Multilevel Data Management Security in 1982 [1].
The notion of a 'spray paint' to label elements in
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the database system was also suggested by the
study. The integrity lock approach applied a checksum function to the contents of each record, and
maintained this checksum for each record to detect
illegal tampering by opponents who by-passed the
filter.

The implementation of the integrity lock design
was done on the MISTRESS database management
system running on the Unix operating system [7].
A description of the operating system support
environment for the integrity lock approach is
given by Graubart and Kramer [6].

Ideally, the checksum should be a cryptographic
hash function or encryption algorithm which is
resistant to attacks based on cryptanalysis. The
checksum is calculated whenever data is to be
stored in the database system, and it is recomputed and compared with the stored checksum
to detect illegal changes since the last modification
of the data. The data in the records are not
encrypted, to allow record processing by the database system, and the correct labelling of data
remains the task of the filter. These checksums
provide only error detection, not error correction.

In this paper we follow the direction taken by
Denning [2] and Graubart [S] in the use of cryptographic techniques to achieve record authentication. However, unlike these approaches which use
symmetric or asymmetric cryptosystems to
generate a checksum, our approach is based on the
application of the concept of the sibling intractable
function family (SIFF) which was first introduced
by the work in [8].

The use of checksums for data in database records
has received attention, notably in the works of
Denning (2-4] and Graubart et al. (S-7]. The work
by Denning in [2] is significant because it identifies
the granularity of the data to be protected, namely
whole records, whole attributes or individual data
elements.
The other major work on the integrity lock
approach was by Graubart [SJ, where it was applied
to a commercial 'off-the-shelf' database management system. The components of the integrity lock
design in [5] are the Un trusted Front End (UTFE),
the Trusted Front End (TFE) and the untrusted
database management system. The UTFE performs
query parsing and the formatting of output to the
user. The TFE performs tasks such as user authentication, tuple formatting, projections of data, and
the calculations and verification of the checksums.
The untrusted database system performs the usual
tasks of record searching, tuple selection, insertion
and deletion, and also database reconfiguration.
The tuple in the database is left as plaintext for
performance reasons, while the label and checksum
are encrypted. As expected, the use of encryption
expands the storage requirements of the database.
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In the previous approaches based on the use of
cryptosystems a choice had to be made between a
checksum for the entire record and a checksum for
each data element in the record. The first method
was advantageous in terms of space requirements,
but resulted in the need to involve every data
element in the record when the intention was to
authenticate only one data element. The second
method remedied this difficulty by creating a
separate checksum for each data element in the
record. In this way each data element could be
authenticated independently of the other data
elements, but the space requirements would be
more than those for the first method. However,
with today's rapidly decreasing cost of secondary
storage the second method is becoming less
intolerable.
Our approach in the checksum calculation for
plaintext (or enciphered) records is based on having
a single checksum for each record. However, our
approach allows each data element in the record to
be authenticated independently of the others using
the same record checksum. Another advantage lies
in the flexibility of placing the description of the
instances of SIFF associated with each record in the
same storage as the records. This removes the need
to have specialized secure storage which, in general,
is several magnitudes higher in cost than the
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ordinary secondary storage media. Finally, our
approach allows the authentication of data
elements without necessarily needing any secret
cryptographic
information.
This
compares
favourably to Denning's approach whereby a secret
encryption key must be used before any data
element can be authenticated.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In
Section 2 the necessary definitions of the sibling
intractable function family and of the pseudorandom function family will be presented. This is
followed by the use of the sibling intractable
function family for record authentication in
Section 3, and its further use for the generation of
cryptographic keys in the case of the encipherment
of the database in Section 4. The paper is closed by
some remarks and conclusion in Section 5.
2. Background in cryptography
This section introduces two basic constructs for
our database authentication scheme, namely,
pseudo-random function families and sibling intractable
Junction families (SIFF).
Denote by .IV the set of all positive integers, n a
security parameter, L the alphabet {O, I} and # 5
the number of elements in a set S. By x E R 5 we
mean that x is chosen randomly and uniformly
from the set s. The composition of two functions
and g is defined as J og(x) =f(g(x)). Throughout the
paper I and m will be used to denote polynomials
from .IV to .IV.

J

Section 3. Intuitively, F = {Fn In E.IV} is a pseudorandom function family if, to a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, the output of a function
chosen randomly and uniformly from F n , whose
description is unknown to the algorithm, appears
to be totally uncorrelated to the input ofJ, even if
the algorithm can choose input for f The formal
definition is described in terms of (uniform) statistical
tests for functions. A (uniform) statistical test for
functions is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm A that, given n as input and access to an
oracle 6' for a functionj:LI(n)-> Lm(n), outputs a bit
f
or 1. A can query the oracle only by writing on a
special tape some yELI(n) and will read the oracle
answer J(y) on a separate answer-tape. The oracle
prints its answer in one step.

J

°

Definition 1 Let F = {FnIn E.IV} be an infinite family
ofJunctions, where Fn = {fl f:LI{n) -> Lm{n)}. Assume that
F is both polynomial time computable and sa mpla ble. F is
a pseudo-random function family iff,for any statistical test A, for any polynomial Q, and for all sufficiently
large n,
Ip~ - p~1

< lIQ(n)

where p~ denotes the probability that A outputs 1 on
input n and access to an oracle 6'ffor fERFn and p~ the
probability that A outputs 1 on input n and access to an
oracle 6' r for aJunction r chosen randomly and uniformly
from the set oj all functions from LI(n) to Lm(n). The
probabilities are computed over all the possible choices off,
r and the internal coin tosses of A
In [9], it has been shown that pseudo-random
function families can be constructed from any
pseudo-random string generators. By the result of
[10, 11], the existence of anyone-way functions is
sufficient for the construction of pseudo-random
function families.

Let F= {Fnl n E.IV} be an infinite family of
functions, where Fn= (f1j:LI(n)-> Lm(n)}. We call F
a function family mapping I (n)-bit input to m(n)bit output string. F is polynomial time computable if
there is a polynomial time algorithm (in n) computing all J E F, and samplable if there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that, on input
n E.IV, outputs uniformly at random a description
ofJEFn·

The following definition of the collision accessibility
property is presented because of its importance in
the definition of sibling intractable function
families.

Now, we introduce the definition of pseudorandom functions [9] which will be applied in

Definition 2. Let U = UnUn be a family ofJunctions
that is polynomial time computable, samplable, and maps
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l(n)-bit input into m(n)-bit output strings. Let k be a
fixed positive integer. U has the collision accessibility
property if, for all nand for all 1:S;j:S; k, given any set
X={x l , x 2 ' ••• , x} of j initial strings in L1(n), it is
possible in probabilistic polynomial time to select
randomly and uniformly functions from U~, where
U~ C Un is the set ofall functions in Un that map x /J x 2,
... , and Xj to the same strings in Lm(n).
Now we are ready to introduce the notion of the
sibling intractable function family. Let k = k(n) be a
polynomial with k(n)~ 1 and H={HnlnEff},
where Hn={hlh:LI(n)---Lm(n)}, be an infinite family
of functions that is polynomial time computable,
samplable and has the collision accessibility
property. Also le.t X = {Xl' X 2' ••• , xJ be a set of i
initial strings in LI(n), where l:S;i:s;k, and h be a
function in Hn that maps Xl' X 2' ... , Xj to the same
string. Let F, called a siblingfinder, be a probabilistic
polynomial time algorithm that, on input X and h,
ourputs either "?" ("I cannot find") or a string
X'ELI(n) such that x'tEX and h(x')=h(x l )=
h(xz) = ... = h (xJ Informally, H is a k-sibling intractable function family, or k-SIFF for short, if, for any
1 :s; i:s; k, for any sibling finder F, the probability
that F ourputs an x' is negligible. More precisely:

Definition 3. Let k = k(n) be a polynomial with
k(n)~ 1 and H={HnlnEff} be afamily offunctions
that is polynomial time computable, sa mpla bIe, has the
collision accessibility property and maps l(n)-bit input
into m(n)-bit output strings. Let X = {x l' X 2 , ••• , xJ
be any set of i initial strings, where 1:s;i:s;k. H is a
k-sibling intractable function family, or simply
k-SIFF, if,for each 1 :S;i:s;k,for each siblingfinder F,fo r
each polynomial Q, andfor all sufficiently large n,

Pr{F(X, h) ~ ?} < lIQ(n)
where h is chosen randomly and uniformly from
H~ C H n, the set of all functions in Hn that map x I' X 2'
... , and Xi to the same strinf!.s in Lm(n), and the probability
Pr{F(X, h) ~?} is computed over H~ and the sample
space of all finite strings of coin flips that F could have
tossed.
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In [8] an explicit construction of SIFF from any
one-way function was given. The reader is directed
to [8] for other applications ofSIFF.

3. Using SIFF to authenticate records
Following [2], we will denote record i as having a
record identifier R j and field (or attribute) j as
having the field identifier F. The actual value of
field j in record i is denoted as Xij' For simplicity,
we assume that the security labels will be applied at
the record level, incorporated into the record
identifier R j • Hence, R j should be unique for each
record and is assumed to contain enough information to determine the security classification of the
record. If security classification is to be applied at
the data element level, then it is assumed that for
each field F an additional field F j exists in the
record which contains the security classification of
data element Xij (see [2, 3]). We also assume that a
key Kdb for the whole database exists, and is stored
in a tamper-free condition. In the remainder of this
paper we will use the term trusted party (TP) to
denote a trusted agent which holds the secret
cryptographic information necessary for the checksum generation and verification, and for the encipherment and decipherment of data in the records.
The trusted party can be an intermediary between
the user and the database, or it can be a separate
function in the database system. However, we will
not be concerned any further with the acrual architecture of the system that incorporates the trusted
party.
The use of SIFF to calculate checksums for fields
provides an alternative method for data integrity.
The calculation of record checksums using SIFF
has the major advantage of field checksums,
namely that it allows a single checksum value to be
associated with each record yet allows each data
item to be authenticated independently of other
data items in the record .
3.1 Mathematical description

Consider an (a + 1)-SIFF, where a is an integer
denoting the number of fields in each record i

Computers & Security, Vol. 13, No. 7

including the record identifier Ri and its security
classification. We assume that every record follows
this arrangement uniformly. The trusted party
holds a secret information Sdb. In addition, it
generates the key Kdb which is publicly readable in
a tamper-free state. The public state of Kdb allows
any party, trusted or otherwise, to verify that the
data in the database is authentic.

where Si is a randomly chosen n-bit string, the
checksum for record i. Here' II' denotes concatenation. In this way the data element X ij (1 s;, j s;, a) can
be authenticated when

Let H = (Hn In Eff) be an (a + 1)-SIFF mapping nbit input to n-bit output strings. Furthermore,
assume that F=(FnlnEff} is a pseudo-random
function family, where Fn={jKljK:L1(n)-L n,
KELn) and each functionjKEFn is specified by an
n-bit string K. Here we must have that
IXijl + IRil + IFjl~1 (n), and padding (such as in [2])
can be used.

3.2 Checking instances of SIFF

For each record i we choose uniformly and
randomly from Hn an instance ofSIFF hi such thar.

h,(J,db(R i II Sdb)) = hi(fKdb(Xil I Rill F1))
= ... = hi(!Kdb(Xia IIR"'Fa)) = Si

.............

~

lSdb l
L.....J

t

Ri IISdb

(1)

Ideally, the description of the instances of SIFF hi
should be placed in secure storage within the
security perimeter of the trusted party. However,
due to the large size of the description of these
instances of SIFF a more manageable approach
would be to store them in a 'shadow' database or
together with the actual data in the database. In any
case, the description of the instances h, of SIFF can
be placed in a publicly readable storage since any
modifications to them or to the checksums Si can
be detected through the use of Sdb. That is, if hi of
record i is modified illegally into h;, then using the
false h; will not yield the correct checksum value,
as shown in the following:

~

~

[!J

XiI

Xi2

X ia

t

1 I

t

XilIlRi"Fi X i2 11Ri llF2
I

is satisfied. This process is shown in Fig. 1.

I~

t
XialiRiliFa

I I

Fig. 1. Using SIFF for database authentication.
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due to the fact that Sdb is secret. This is true even if
the false h; yields the correct checksum for all the
fields Fp Fz' ... , Fa:

h:(fKdb(XilIIRiIIFI)) = h:(!Kdb(Xiz IIRil1 Fz))

3.4 Security of the database authentication scheme

= ... = h:(fKdb(XiaIIRiIIFa)) = Si
If Si is modified illegally into 5; then the output of
hi will not match the false 5;. This is shown in the
following:

Suppose that both hi and Si are illegally modified
into h; and 5; respectively; theri, due to the participation of the secret Sdb' we still have that

which indicates that the illegal modifications have
occurred.
The sibling intractable property of SIFF allows the
detection by the trusted party of any illegal modification to either or both of hi and Si. The secrecy of
Sdb is necessary to ensure that only the trusted party
can create Si through the selection of a suitable
instance ofSIFF hi for record i.
3.3 Field authentication

The idea of maintaining a checksum for whole
fields (or attributes) was also suggested by Denning
[2, 3]. Similar to record checksums, an instance h)
of a (/3 + 1)-SIFF can be used for field checksums as
follows:

hj (f,db(F; I Sdb)) = h; (!Kdb(X I j IIRIII Fj))
= ... = hj (!Kdb(Xpj I Rpil Fj)) = Sj
where

(2)

/3 is the number of records in the database.

This approach, however, is impractical because the
update of a value Xi; (1 ~ i ~ /3, 1 ~ j~ a) requires the
involvement of all" the field values Xlj' XZj' ... ,
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Xf3j in the recalculation of the checksum Sj. This
approach is more suitable to be applied to fields
which are rarely changed, such as an employee'S
name and birth date in the case of a company database.
The record authentication scheme in eq. (1) can be
considered secure if it is computationally difficult
for an illegal user (or a trojan horse) to find the
secret value Sdb even when the user knows K db , hi
and Si. We will assume that the computational
power of an illegal user or a trojan horse is
bounded by probabilistic polynomial time.
In more definite terms, we can say that for a database with a total of /3 records, each having a different instance Iz i of SIFF associated with it, the record
authentication scheme is secure if, for any data
element X,j in the database, for any polynomial Q,
and for all sufficiently large n, the probability that
an illegal user or a trojan horse can find Sdb using
Kdb is less than I1Q(n). This also holds true when
every record i in the database is given a different
key K db , (i = 1, ... , /3) which are all known to the
illegal user or the trojan horse.
Now, the ability of an illegal user or a trojan horse
to calculate Sdb is equivalent to that of predicting
outputs of a pseudo-random function. This is a
contradiction to the definition of pseudo-random
function families. In fact, the ability of an illegal
user or a trojan horse to obtain even the input
string .L(Rillsdb ) (or J,Jl)llsdb)) represents a
further contradiction. Such an ability implies that
the user or the trojan horse is able to invert or to
find a collision string for the sibling intractable
function family, both cases of which have a negligible probability of happening. Hence, the database
authentication scheme in eqs. (1) and (2) is secure
provided that Sdb remains secret.

4. Using SIFF to generate encipherment
keys
Independent, but related to the issue of database
authentication, is the issue of protection of the
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database from illegal access. One possible method
of preventing illegal access to records in the database is by way of encipherment techniques. In
simple terms, this involves the encipherment of
records in the database using a cryptosystem that
requires an encipherment key as one of its
parameters. The database then consists of
enciphered records which can be read or updated
only through the use of the decipherment key
(which may be different, but related, to the
encipherment key).
In the trusted party concept it is intended that a
user should interact with the database through the
trusted party, which on behalf of the user accesses
the database, deciphers the retrieved records and
presents the resulting plaintext records to the user.
Records with fields of higher security classification
than the user's security clearance can be filtered
out, or the whole record can be suppressed from
the user. Hence it is the task of a user to present
some form of identification information to the
trusted party, which then authenticates the user
and retrieves the required data from the database
depending on the user's security clearance.
The simplest use of a SIFF in this simation is for it
to derive the decipherment key by using the user's
secret key or password as input to the instance of
SIFF. Assume that there are P users having the
secret keys Ku I' ... , Kup respectively. Furthermore,
assume that KT is the secret key of the trusted
party, haec is the instance of SIFF maintained as a
secret by the trusted party, and Kdec is the decipherment key. The trusted party must choose
uniformly and randomly from Hn an instance haec
of a P-SIFF such thac

hacJAT(KT )) = hacc(!KT(Ku))
= ... = hacc(!KT(Kup)) = Kdec

(3)

Note that here Kdec should never be visible or
accessible to the users. Hence its derivation must be
a guarded privilege of the trusted party. The
enciphered records are then retrieved by the

trusted party and deciphered using Kdec within the
security bounds of the trusted party.
This simple idea using SIFF, as expressed in eq. (3),
can be extended further to the multilevel case
where users are grouped according to their security
clearances, each group having access to a subset of
the database depending on the security clearance. ,

5. Conclusion
An alternative approach to the authentication of
databases has been the topic of research in this
paper. The approach is realized in a scheme which
is based on pseudo-random functions and the
sibling intractable function family (SIFF). The
security of the scheme has been shown to be
equivalent to predicting the output of pseudorandom functions and inverting the sibling intractable function family, both of which have a small
probability of occurring.
The scheme, which has been discussed in the context of the concept of the trusted party that acts as
an intermediary between the user and the database,
allows each record to be associated with one checksum which can be used to verify the authenticity of
one data element within the record independently
from other data elements. The scheme also has the
advantage that it requires only a small amount of
information to be maintained secret, which is
something affordable for the trusted party. Related
to this is the advantage that the description of the
instances of SIFF can be placed in the same storage
area as the records of the database and their
associated checksums. In this way no secure storage
needs to be assigned for the maintenance of the
instances of SIFF arid the checksums. The scheme is
also suitable for the generation of encipherment
(and decipherment) keys in enciphered databases to
allow only legal access to the database.
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